Anatomy of a Model & Medical Parser Compromise#
AI inference servers rarely execute pure matrix multiplication in isolation. Before a single CUDA kernel launches, the ingestion worker parses complex TLV (Tag-Length-Value) binary structures such as DICOM Part 10 files, decompresses JPEG-2000 streams, and deserializes model weights.
Defense-in-Depth Architecture with eBPF LSM & Rust#
User-space seccomp filters alone cannot inspect kernel object paths or dynamically correlate process trees with cgroup v2 container identities. By combining unprivileged Rust Landlock filesystem restrictions with an in-kernel eBPF LSM policy engine, we confine inference workers to strictly verified memory and file descriptors.
Implementing the eBPF LSM Socket & Execution Guard
Once a model inference worker finishes initialization and signals readiness via a one-way control pipe, its cgroup v2 ID is added to the `locked_inference_cgroups` BPF hash map. Any subsequent attempt to invoke `execve` or establish outbound TCP connections (`socket_connect`) is denied directly inside the kernel LSM hook:
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include "vmlinux.h"
#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
#include <bpf/bpf_tracing.h>
#include <errno.h>
struct {
__uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH);
__uint(max_entries, 1024);
__type(key, __u64); // cgroup_id
__type(value, __u8); // lockdown_state (1 = sealed)
} locked_inference_cgroups SEC(".maps");
SEC("lsm/bprm_check_security")
int BPF_PROG(restrict_ai_worker_exec, struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
__u64 cgroup_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
__u8 *sealed = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&locked_inference_cgroups, &cgroup_id);
if (sealed && *sealed == 1) {
bpf_printk("SYNAPSE-SEC: Blocked execve attempt in sealed AI cgroup %llu\n", cgroup_id);
return -EPERM;
}
return 0;
}
SEC("lsm/socket_connect")
int BPF_PROG(restrict_ai_worker_egress, struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
{
__u64 cgroup_id = bpf_get_current_cgroup_id();
__u8 *sealed = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&locked_inference_cgroups, &cgroup_id);
if (sealed && *sealed == 1 && address->sa_family != AF_UNIX) {
// Deny all IPv4/IPv6 network egress from sealed inference workers
return -EACCES;
}
return 0;
}
char LICENSE[] SEC("license") = "GPL";Performance & Telemetry Benchmarks#
Because eBPF LSM programs execute in-place without context-switching to a user-space ptrace supervisor, syscall overhead remains below across high-throughput DICOM ingestion workloads.